The most interesting ethical approaches surveyed in the first chapter to me were pragmatism and ecofeminism. Since Abbey has already written thoughtfully about ecofeminism on her blog, I'll contribute a few thoughts on pragmatism, though I'm sure we will delve into them both in greater depth later in the course.
One of my first thoughts when reading our book's summary of the approach was how similar it seems to Professor Silliman's multi-criterial value incrementalism, though with a less specific name (I'm curious to hear how he might differentiate the two). Philosophical pragmatism, perhaps more broadly, views thought as a functional tool for practical application. Like Professor Silliman's MCVI, it recognizes the need to account for changing environments and changing inputs into those environments when making philosophical judgments. It is an ongoing practice, requiring constant reassessment, and so is fundamentally dependent on the flow of experience, and the adaptation of those doing the experiencing--not abstract thought.
A common criticism of pragmatism is that it is anthropocentric, since it views thought as instrumental to our ends. But instrumental value and intrinsic value are not mutually exclusive. There is no reason that the inherent values of other creatures, other systems, or objects may not also be considered along with their instrumental value. It simply requires a broad awareness to attend the assessment.
Here is a relatively accessible essay on environmental pragmatism. The first part of chapter 2 is most relevant. In sum:
- We cannot talk about the environment without referring to our experience of that environment.
- Experience is not just subjective, but often objective. This is pertinent to ethical consideration.
- Previous ethical assumptions need to be extended, and likely transformed to meet new environmental quandaries in ongoing determinations.
- Like ecofeminism, it is largely concerned with interrelations within and to ecosystems.
Why would a philosophical approach ever want to consider itself something other than pragmatic?
Appreciate the link to Parker’s essay, “Pragmatism and Environmental Thought”.
ReplyDeleteHere is just one of many key passages:
“Immanuel Kant provided the starting point for pragmatic metaphysics. The noumenal world, the world as it in itself independent of the ordering categories of the mind, is by definition incapable of entering into knowledge or experience. To a pragmatist, the concept of a world, entity or property existing apart from the ordering influence of mind is strictly meaningless. TO speak of the world at all is thus to speak of what Kant called the phenomenal world. To be real is to be capable of entering into experience; a thing’s effects, its relations to other phenomena, are thus all there is to be known about the thing. The early pragmatists accordingly dropped talk of forms, essences and substances, and set about developing a new metaphysics born of experience.”
And Jon asks, “Why would a philosophical approach ever want to consider itself something other than pragmatic?”
I think there may be value in thinking of something seemingly outside of human experience, or “…apart from the ordering influence of mind…”. Plato’s Forms and Kant’s noumenal world for instance might help us to empathize with something that we consider to be absolutely separate from ourselves. Considering such things as essence and substance may also aid in our suppression of “all too human” narcissistic urges in regard to the environment. Perhaps the idea of a moral theorist or a research physician may help us understand this question, they perform vital tasks and yet seem alienated from the practical application of results; research doctors are not known for their bedside manner. This topic was explored in Margaret Edson’s play W;t. But this may not be what we’re after at all, as even in those cases there is direct correspondence with the real world or world of phenomena as Kant designates reality.
Are we even capable of thinking completely "...apart from the ordering influence of mind"? I would imagine any thoughts we have are traceable to conceptualized experience. So if there ever were such a thing as Plato's world of Forms, which is completely outside human experience, then we are only able to think about it because of our imaginative expansion of what has already been experienced.
Delete" Considering such things as essence and substance may also aid in our suppression of “all too human” narcissistic urges in regard to the environment."
This seems like it has practical use--to aid in the suppression of narcissistic urges. The moral theorists and the research physicians with poor bedside manner are indeed alienated from practical application of their work, but they work towards practical application nonetheless. Though they probably also do their work for other reasons, one of them may be that they find the work worthwhile in itself. But even then, could that just be reduced to the practical effect of pleasure it gives them?
Perhaps my original question is phrased in an unhelpful way. Any answer given to it will prove its implication that value must serve something or other, and so cannot be valuable in itself.
Jon asks: Why would a philosophical approach ever want to consider itself something other than pragmatic?
ReplyDeleteThat's a fair question, particularly given the precising definition of 'pragmatic' that precedes it. The term 'pragmatism' does have many meanings, however, both within philosophy and in the world at large, and there are good reasons many people might steer clear of the term.
Somewhat like the term "naturalism", I would think. Everyone wants their theory to be natural; it's only natural.
Delete