At the heart of Rolston's argument is an assertion of what value is, and where it originates. This is no small task--it is to answer an entire branch of philosophy. "[T]here is value wherever there is positive creativity," he says. He is asking us to do something quite difficult, I think. To understand, feel, and respect the intrinsic value in a tree seems like it requires a long drawing-out of empathy and awareness, an extension we are not accustomed to making.
At this point I think I understand what Rolston is saying, find it compelling, but I am not yet able to feel the weight of it fully, and so have not been able to swallow his argument whole. It is something that will surely be referenced when we compare and contrast future readings, which will hopefully help clear our understandings of Rolston.
Thursday, January 30, 2014
Saturday, January 25, 2014
Time-Lapse of Every Nuclear Explosion from 1945 - 1998
For essentially being just a map with beeps and dots, this is pretty terrifying (due in part, I think, to the artist's suspenseful use of sound and silence, which is hauntingly musical--the months being the metronome). It's difficult to conceive the full scale of the environmental impact these 2,053 explosions have made.
Every time a nuclear device is detonated, the Mayor of Hiroshima writes a letter protesting the test. The mayors have been doing this since 1968.
The Atomic Cafe
The documentary below is a sharp, darkly humorous window into our collective propensity for naivete and vacuous critical and moral thinking. It's apparent how directly it can effect our environment. Some salient moments:
"Watched from a safe distance, this explosion is one of the most beautiful sights ever seen by man. You're probably saying, 'so it's beautiful, what makes it so dangerous?'"
-- Army training video (watched from a safe distance)
"nackesackee, pretty as a picture...I let the bomb go--that was my greatest thrill"-- Pilot on the bombing of Nagasaki
It's hard not to compare this sort of catastrophic enablism by an indoctrinated public to our current situation with the environment, among other things.
Thursday, January 23, 2014
Dipping into Pragmatism
The most interesting ethical approaches surveyed in the first chapter to me were pragmatism and ecofeminism. Since Abbey has already written thoughtfully about ecofeminism on her blog, I'll contribute a few thoughts on pragmatism, though I'm sure we will delve into them both in greater depth later in the course.
One of my first thoughts when reading our book's summary of the approach was how similar it seems to Professor Silliman's multi-criterial value incrementalism, though with a less specific name (I'm curious to hear how he might differentiate the two). Philosophical pragmatism, perhaps more broadly, views thought as a functional tool for practical application. Like Professor Silliman's MCVI, it recognizes the need to account for changing environments and changing inputs into those environments when making philosophical judgments. It is an ongoing practice, requiring constant reassessment, and so is fundamentally dependent on the flow of experience, and the adaptation of those doing the experiencing--not abstract thought.
A common criticism of pragmatism is that it is anthropocentric, since it views thought as instrumental to our ends. But instrumental value and intrinsic value are not mutually exclusive. There is no reason that the inherent values of other creatures, other systems, or objects may not also be considered along with their instrumental value. It simply requires a broad awareness to attend the assessment.
Here is a relatively accessible essay on environmental pragmatism. The first part of chapter 2 is most relevant. In sum:
- We cannot talk about the environment without referring to our experience of that environment.
- Experience is not just subjective, but often objective. This is pertinent to ethical consideration.
- Previous ethical assumptions need to be extended, and likely transformed to meet new environmental quandaries in ongoing determinations.
- Like ecofeminism, it is largely concerned with interrelations within and to ecosystems.
Why would a philosophical approach ever want to consider itself something other than pragmatic?
One of my first thoughts when reading our book's summary of the approach was how similar it seems to Professor Silliman's multi-criterial value incrementalism, though with a less specific name (I'm curious to hear how he might differentiate the two). Philosophical pragmatism, perhaps more broadly, views thought as a functional tool for practical application. Like Professor Silliman's MCVI, it recognizes the need to account for changing environments and changing inputs into those environments when making philosophical judgments. It is an ongoing practice, requiring constant reassessment, and so is fundamentally dependent on the flow of experience, and the adaptation of those doing the experiencing--not abstract thought.
A common criticism of pragmatism is that it is anthropocentric, since it views thought as instrumental to our ends. But instrumental value and intrinsic value are not mutually exclusive. There is no reason that the inherent values of other creatures, other systems, or objects may not also be considered along with their instrumental value. It simply requires a broad awareness to attend the assessment.
Here is a relatively accessible essay on environmental pragmatism. The first part of chapter 2 is most relevant. In sum:
- We cannot talk about the environment without referring to our experience of that environment.
- Experience is not just subjective, but often objective. This is pertinent to ethical consideration.
- Previous ethical assumptions need to be extended, and likely transformed to meet new environmental quandaries in ongoing determinations.
- Like ecofeminism, it is largely concerned with interrelations within and to ecosystems.
Why would a philosophical approach ever want to consider itself something other than pragmatic?
Wednesday, January 15, 2014
Introductory Post
Hello!
My name is Jon. I'm a philosophy major concentrating in law, ethics, and society. I look forward to many lively discussion threads.
Today in class, it struck me that both the action biocentrists advocate, and the action strict (informed) utilitarians advocate seem quite similar: we have to do more to prevent the destruction of the planet. So the opposing moral theories here call for the same response in practice. The same can't be said for our lifeboat scenario if J.S. Mill and Kant were in our counsel ("eat Sebastian to save us all", and "don't eat Sebastian, he is infinitely valuable!", respectively). But it seems for the sake of advancing the conservational agenda in the political arena, the most effective arguments for environmentalism are going to be based on the planet's direct and indirect instrumental value to us. Regardless of whether we ought to view our planet and its life systems as inherently valuable, its stability is a moral obligation to our own species -- on the most massive scale conceivable, really -- because we are helplessly dependent on its good health.
“What's the use of a fine house if you haven't got a tolerable planet to put it on?”--Thoreau
My name is Jon. I'm a philosophy major concentrating in law, ethics, and society. I look forward to many lively discussion threads.
Today in class, it struck me that both the action biocentrists advocate, and the action strict (informed) utilitarians advocate seem quite similar: we have to do more to prevent the destruction of the planet. So the opposing moral theories here call for the same response in practice. The same can't be said for our lifeboat scenario if J.S. Mill and Kant were in our counsel ("eat Sebastian to save us all", and "don't eat Sebastian, he is infinitely valuable!", respectively). But it seems for the sake of advancing the conservational agenda in the political arena, the most effective arguments for environmentalism are going to be based on the planet's direct and indirect instrumental value to us. Regardless of whether we ought to view our planet and its life systems as inherently valuable, its stability is a moral obligation to our own species -- on the most massive scale conceivable, really -- because we are helplessly dependent on its good health.
“What's the use of a fine house if you haven't got a tolerable planet to put it on?”--Thoreau
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